

NOTES - SCRUTINY MEETING (STRATEGIC POLICING REQUIREMENT) - 29 JULY 2025

Question	Brief Summary of Evidence	Decision of PCC
1. Since the Scrutiny Meeting, held on 9 July 2024, what new evidence can be provided on the Force's ability and preparedness to fulfil the requirements of the SPR? To include details of: i. the process to assess, plan, prepare and respond each threat type; ii. the governance and reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Force is fulfilling its responsibilities for tackling the seven threats; and iii. the threat types that have been identified as the most significant risks locally and the response required to fully combat these risks.	- The National Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) assessment framework focuses on capability, capacity, consistency, collaboration and connectivity. - The SPR Delivery Model outlines the local, regional and national policing response required to counter the specified threats (Violence Against Women and Girls, Child Sexual Abuse, Serious and Organised Crime, Terrorism, Public Disorder, Civil Emergencies and National Cyber Event). - The Force has a local SPR governance framework, which ensures regular and routine review, clearly defined outcomes, Chief Officer oversight and appropriate governance. The framework assists with connecting the local to the national and ensuring the Force is inspection ready. - To provide increased oversight, the Force has reviewed and improved governance processes and reporting mechanisms. - The Force conducts an annual review of the SPR. The latest assessment was completed in June 2025. - The Force has appropriate governance arrangements in place to review and strengthen plans and deal with any new threats or increases in these crimes. Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) - There are high levels of VAWG in Cleveland, with VAWG offences equating to 23% of total crime. - The Force recognises that VAWG offences are linked to other high-risk offending, such as Domestic Abuse (DA), Child Sexual Abuse (CSA) and Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE). - The Force acknowledges the need for a multi-functional and multi-agency response to VAWG. - The Force has identified limitations in terms of capability and capacity due to the high volume of offending in Cleveland. - To improve investigative capability and capacity, training is being provided to officers to increase investigative resilience and broaden the skills and awareness of vulnerability-based crime. - The Force has in place a two-year transformation plan for Operation Soteria, which aims to transform the approach to rape investigations and prosecutions. The Force is committed to delivering sustained improvement in this area and is performing well. The opportunities presented by Operation Soteria assist the Force in maximising its capabilities. - The operational response to VAWG has been developed in line with the recommended eight-point plan, as per the Force Control Strategy. - VAWG is included as a key objective in the Chief Constable's Strategic Plan. - The Force takes a victim-centred approach to VAWG, which means prioritising the needs and wishes of the victim in all actions and decisions related to their case. - The Force's Operation Artemis VAWG Day of Action has taken place, with another one planned. The VAWG Day of Action involves targeted patrols, arrests of domestic abuse suspects, and raising awareness about Clare's Law (Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme).	Assured <i>The PCC recognises that the Force has a culture of continuous improvement, which is crucial for enhancing policing capabilities and adapting to evolving threats and challenges.</i>

- The Force has a Vulnerability Strategy, which aims to improve the quality of policing for people who are vulnerable and create a vulnerability-centred approach to policing.
- The Force is taking part in a pilot of Domestic Abuse Protective Orders (DAPOs) and Domestic Abuse Protection Notices (DAPNs). DAPOs and DAPNs offer a quick and effective way for police to intervene in situations where there is a risk of harm. They also help to prevent further incidents, even when there is not enough evidence for a criminal charge. DAPNs and DAPOs are used to impose restrictions and conditions on a perpetrator of domestic abuse.
- The governance structures and processes in place for VAWG are outlined below:
 - VAWG is a key feature at the Managing Performance Across Cleveland Together (IMPACT) Board, which is chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable (DCC).
 - VAWG is considered at the Safeguarding Governance Group, which is chaired by the Assistant Chief Constable (ACC).
 - A Detective Superintendent is the Strategic Lead for VAWG. In March 2025, the Strategic Lead completed a full self-assessment to address gaps, based on risk. The Strategic Lead attends meetings of regional and national bodies.
 - The Force has a DA Improvement Board, which is chaired by the ACC. The board works to improve the response to, and support for, victims of domestic abuse.
 - The Force has a multi-agency Rape Scrutiny Panel, which meets on a quarterly basis. The panel provides independent oversight to the investigation and handling of rape cases reported to Cleveland Police.
 - The Force has a multi-agency No Further Action (NFA) Scrutiny Panel. The panel examines cases that have been deemed 'no further action'. Cases for consideration are randomly selected, with input from the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). The NFA Scrutiny Panel aims to improve the quality of decision-making, and in turn, public confidence.
 - Domestic Abuse is a key feature of local performance frameworks.
 - VAWG features in the Force Control Strategy, given its significant links to domestic abuse and sexual offending (both high risk) and high levels of misogyny in many of Cleveland's local communities.

Child Sexual Abuse

- A comprehensive problem profile has been completed for Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) and a problem profile for Child Sexual Abuse (CSA) is in development. The primary objective of these profiles is to improve understanding of the patterns, hot spots and trends in reported CSE and CSA offences in Cleveland.
- The Force continues to work hard to improve how it safeguards vulnerable children. In June 2024, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Rescue Services (HMICFRS) published its findings following the national child protection inspection (NCPI) of Cleveland Police. The Force has developed an NCPI improvement action plan and has undertaken a substantial amount of

	work to address the areas of concern and areas of improvement identified by the HMICFRS. The Force is committed and dedicated to making ongoing improvements to safeguard children at risk. • In terms of reasonable staffing levels, skills requirements and gaps have been identified and mapped against the detective accreditation pathway. Clearly defined detective pathways, in child abuse roles, are now in place. • A detailed demand analysis has been completed, and training is being provided to ensure officers and staff have the knowledge, skills and appropriate tools to effectively investigate reports of child abuse, neglect and exploitation. • The Force's Paedophile Online Investigation Team (POLIT) has a dedicated line manager, a Detective Inspector, who provides supervisory oversight of investigations and conducts case file reviews to improve the quality of work. • The Force's operational response to CSA has been developed in line with the recommended eight-point plan, as per Force Control Strategy. • Work is being undertaken by the Force to secure improvements for vulnerable children and ensure that all child rape victims receive a specialist response. • The Force is delivering training and has ongoing corporate communications regarding its child-centred AWARE campaign. AWARE can be used in any context and provides signs to look out for, and be aware of, to identify early intervention and safeguarding opportunities. AWARE stands for: A - Appearance, W - Words, A - Activity, R - Relationships and dynamics and E - Environment. • Family First will involve a senior leader from the policing and is due to be implemented April 2026. • The governance structures and processes in place for CSA are outlined below: ○ CSA is a key feature at the IMPACT Board, which is chaired by the DCC. ○ CSA is considered at the Safeguarding Governance Group, which is chaired by the ACC. ○ A Detective Superintendent is the Strategic Lead for CSA. ○ There is a South Tees Safeguarding Children Partnership and a Hartlepool & Stockton-on-Tees Safeguarding Children Partnership. Safeguarding children's partnerships are collaborative efforts between local authorities, police, and health bodies to coordinate and ensure the safety and well-being of children in a specific area. These partnerships aim to provide targeted services to children and families, ensuring that their needs are met effectively and efficiently. ○ Missing children and submission of Public Protection Notices (PPNs) are a key feature in local performance frameworks ○ To drive improvements for persons who are subject to abuse, neglect and exploitation, the Vulnerability Knowledge and Practice Programme (VKPP) provides a supportive peer review function. The VKPP is undertaking a review of the Force's Child Exploitation Team (CET) functions and findings will be reported shortly. ○ The Force's NCPI improvement action plan outlines the specific steps that will be taken by the Force to improve its child protection work.	
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- CSA is assessed as high risk in the Force's Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) and it remains a consistent feature in the Force Control Strategy.
- The Force acknowledges the level of hidden harm and accumulative risk associated with missing children. The Force monitors and analyses data to determine trends and reduce risk to vulnerable children.
- The Force has a key focus on prevention activity and multi-agency planning and collaboration.

Serious and Organised Crime

- In terms of Serious and Organised Crime (SOC), the Force has good knowledge and understanding of demand.
- The response to SOC is delivered via multi-disciplinary capability with collective responsibility.
- Capacity gaps have been identified; however, the Force recognises that multi-agency collaboration and partnership working are key to managing demand and bridging those capacity gaps.
- The North East Regional Organised Crime Unit (NEROCU) delivers an increased response to tackling SOC that transcends Force borders in the North East region. It provides additional specialist capacity through effective partnership working and collaboration. The support provided by NEROCU ensures resilience for the region, allowing the use of all forms of covert policing tactics.
- The National Crime Agency (NCA) plays a central role in SOC in the UK. It is responsible for leading the national response to these threats, targeting the most harmful organised crime groups, and disrupting their activities. The NCA achieves this through intelligence-led operations, investigations, and by providing specialist capabilities to law enforcement partners.
- The Force's response to SOC is managed through the Force Control Strategy and Tasking and Coordination Processes (TCG).
- The Force is supported by robust intelligence products, Organised Crime Groups (OCG) mapping, identification of priority individuals and vulnerable localities.
- A SOC local profile is scheduled to be published in 2025.
- The Force has a continued focus on delivery of improvements aligned to HMICFRS expectations.
- There continues to be advancements in regional and national capabilities to disrupt and respond to SOC threats.
- To assist with disrupting OCGs, neighbourhood policing resources are utilised, which can include taskforce and tactical operation targeting.
- In terms of local SOC governance structures and processes, there is:
 - a Strategic CONTEST (Protect, Prepare, Prevent and Pursue) and SOC Board, which are chaired by the ACC;
 - a SOC Local Partnership Board, chaired by the Director of Intelligence;
 - a SOC Governance Group; and
 - force and local tasking coordination groups.

- In terms of regional SOC governance structures and processes, there is:
 - a Strategic Governance Group;
 - SOC Thematic Delivery Groups; and
 - a Regional SOC Systems Tasking and Coordination Group.
- SOC is assessed as high risk in the Force's STRA.
- SOC is a consistent feature in the Force Control Strategy.
- There are high levels of associated harm with SOC and an anticipated rise in threat.

Terrorism

- There is strong regional capability, managed by Counter Terrorism Policing North-East (CTPNE), which includes thematic pillar leads and seconded Cleveland resources. Counter-Terrorism Policing is the primary means for disrupting terrorist-related activity in the UK and it leads the police contribution to CONTEST (counter-terrorism strategy) across Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. CTPNE works within the national counter terrorism network to make sure that the police service is better equipped to prevent and respond to incidents of terrorism and to investigate and prosecute those involved.
- The Prevent duty is one of the key pillars of CONTEST. The aim of Prevent is to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. In Cleveland, there are strong multi-agency partnership arrangements in place, which aim to improve the approach and response to terrorism. Effective partnerships are a key component of delivering Prevent.
- There is a Prevent Champions Network, which involves the Force's officers and staff in frontline roles.
- There is a Strategic Prevent Lead within the Force's Prevention Command.
- The Force's response to terrorism is managed through the Force Control Strategy and the Tasking and Coordination Processes.
- A Counter Terrorism Local Profile has been developed, which is reviewed annually and shared with partners.
- The operational response is driven by intelligence and managed by CTPNE using the 4P approach of Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. Intelligence and analytical work are carried out by dedicated units within CTPNE.
- In terms of local terrorism governance structures and processes, there is:
 - a Strategic CONTEST (Protect, Prepare, Prevent and Pursue) and SOC Board, which chaired by the ACC;
 - a Multi-Agency Silver Group, chaired by a local authority;
 - force and local tasking coordination groups.
- In terms of regional terrorism governance structures and processes, there is:
 - a Regional CONTEST Assurance Board (RCAB) led by West Yorkshire; and
 - Multiple threat and risk meetings, attended by a local Counter Terrorism Detective Inspector, as appropriate.

- Terrorism is identified as high risk in the Force's STRA and it is a consistent feature in the Force Control Strategy.
- The threat level in Cleveland is in line with the national threat level of 'substantial'.

Public Disorder

- An Annual Public Order and Public Safety Strategic Risk Assessment (POPS SRA) is undertaken.
- The overall assessment of capacity is 'good'.
- Given recent changes to legislation, the Force now has protest removal capacity.
- The Force takes a proactive approach to tackling football related disorder with positive results.
- There could be potential increase in public disorder in future demand, linked to international unrest
- The Force continues to support regional and mutual aid requests and a planned increase in capacity has now taken place.
- Whilst maintaining local resilience, resources are deployed in accordance with the National Mobilisation Plan. The National Mobilisation Plan is a framework for responding to major public order incidents that require a coordinated national response.
- The Special Constabulary play a key role in handling public disorder, where appropriate.
- The Force is undertaking ongoing work to improve support provided by protest removal teams.
- The Force has introduced Public Order Commanders in each of the 4 local policing areas (Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, Redcar & Cleveland and Stockton).
- The Force provides training and guidance for public order policing, this has been assessed by the College of Policing as 'good'.
- In terms of local public disorder governance structures and processes, there is:
 - a six-monthly Special Capabilities Governance Group, which is chaired by the ACC; and
 - a bi-monthly Strategic Operations and Planning POPS (Public Order Public Safety) Working Group.
- In terms of local public disorder governance structures and processes, there is a Regional North-East POPS Working Group.
- In terms of risk, there is a moderate risk associated with football disorder. Protests and other events are generally small and peaceful in nature.
- There has been recent public disorder events in the UK, related to the Israel-Palestine conflict, and these have primarily centred around protests and actions by Palestine Action. Palestine Action is now a proscribed group. A proscribed group is an organisation or group that is illegal to join or show support for, because it has been identified as being concerned in terrorism.
- The Force has a dynamic risk assessment process in place to highlight any new and emerging risks.

Civil Emergencies

- Capability and capacity gaps have been identified through the Force Management Statement (FMS) process and have been assessed as minor.

- The Force's Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) sits within the Specialist Operations Command.
- EPU staff members have appropriate accreditation, allowing them to deal with major incidents and civil contingencies.
- The Force has 20 Disaster Victim Identification trained officers and staff members capable of carrying out a variety of roles.
- Additional staff provide support via a regional cadre of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) trained officers.
- A multi-agency response is provided via the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP).
- The response to civil emergencies focuses on co-location, communication and co-ordination.
- A Joint Decision Model has been developed to support effective decision-making and the METHANE mnemonic is used to ensure a shared awareness (major incident, exact location, type of incident, hazards, access, number of casualties and emergency services).
- The response to civil emergencies is tested through CoMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards) exercises, which are conducted to test and improve emergency response plans for establishments handling hazardous materials. There is a good testing and exercising regime in place. So far, 5 exercises have been completed this year.
- Good planning arrangements are in place and there is a clear commitment to ongoing provision of mutual aid.
- The governance structures and processes in place for civil emergencies are outlined below:
 - There is a College of Policing APP, for critical incident management and civil emergencies.
 - Strategic and tactical local resilience forums and multi-agency partnerships are in existence.
 - There is a formal debrief structure in place, which is facilitated by the EPU.
 - Business continuity plans have been developed to assist with identifying any further improvements required in this area.
- Dynamic risk assessments are undertaken via the Local Resilience Forum. The level of risk is dependent on the nature of the disaster and the scene.

National Cyber Event

- In terms of capacity and capability, demand continues to increase both in terms of volume and complexity.
- The Security Assessment for Policing (SyAP) recommends that forces assign additional time, and resources, to support the information security burden and compliance. The Force's proposed structural changes will provide this increased resilience.
- The Force's response aligns with the National Institute of Standards and Security (NIST) cybersecurity framework and the Police Digital Service.

	• There is an Information Security Incident Response Plan and ISO27001 in place. ISO27001 is an internationally recognised standard and certification, demonstrating a commitment to information security best practices. • The Force participates in regional events, such as Exercise Mercury. Exercise Mercury is a UK national cyber security exercise designed to test and improve incident response plans. • The Force works with the National Cyber Security Centre to co-ordinate a response and develop and implement business continuity plans, which incorporate business area specific responses to a cyber-attack/ICT failure. • The Force provides officers and staff with information security and compliance advice and guidance. • The Force is moving towards a 'Zero Trust' model. A Zero Trust security model assumes no one is inherently trusted, whether inside or outside the network. • In terms of internal governance structures and processes: ◦ Internal monthly updates are provided, via the Digital Data and Change Board, which is chaired by Chief Finance Officer. ◦ Any significant and/or pressing issues are directed to the Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO) by the Information Security Manager. • In terms of external governance structures and processes: ◦ An annual IT Health Check (pen test) is undertaken. ◦ There is a rolling programme of updates to Police Digital Services. ◦ An annual report is submitted to the Joint Audit Committee. • A major cyber event carries significant risk, which could compromise policing services. • Ransomware and malware attacks continue to be the most likely threat. • The Force recognises that protection of ICT infrastructure is a strategic risk.	
2. What wellbeing support does the Force have in place to ensure that officers and staff are equipped to meet the national policing priorities without undue strain on their own health and wellbeing? How does the Force support/fund the TRIM programme?	• Staff wellbeing is a workforce priority for the Force. • The Force has developed an evidence-led wellbeing provision. • The support provided by the Force aligns to the National Wellbeing Strategy. • The Force has adopted the Blue Light Framework standards, demonstrating a commitment to wellbeing. • The Force has an in-house team, supported by additional 'bought in' professional services. • The Employee Assist Programme (EAP) is accessible to staff, and their families. The EAP provides police officers and staff with confidential, 24/7 support for personal and work-related issues. • The Force helps managers to support and understand the wellbeing needs of their team members. • The Force values and promotes a Trauma Risk Incident Management (TRIM) programme. The programme is a peer-to-peer support system introduced by the Force to support officers and staff across the policing community.	

	• The TRIM programme can be accessed via management referral or self-referral. • The Force provides information on the TRIM programme, at Continuing Professional Development (CPD) events, to raise awareness. • The Force recently introduced a Trauma Incident Reporting Form and QR code. The form provides officers with the ability to identify when an incident has affected them (emotionally and mentally) and it enables the Force to deliver an immediate intervention, if required • On 10 April 2025, HMICFRS published its PEEL 2023-25 (police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy) inspection of Cleveland Police. HMICFRS found that the Force is good at building, supporting and protecting the workforce and has a culture that focuses on well-being. Promising practice was highlighted by HMICFRS, detailing that the day after the summer disorder in 2024, every officer and staff member involved in the work to tackle the disorder received contact from an occupational health professional to check on their wellbeing. • Each year, the Force undertakes a staff survey to gather honest feedback and drive positive change. • The Force has a Strategic Workforce Planning Board, which leads the Force's approach to well-being and is responsible for strategic workforce plans. • The Force is continuously working to promote self-care, increase resilience and improve the wellbeing of officers and staff.	
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